BROWN vs. DUCHESNE.

fallible as every other human institution. Yet it has been and is
a vast agency for good, it has averted many a storm which threatened our peace and has lent its powerful aid in uniting us together
in the bonds of law and justice" Its very existence has proved a
beacon of safety. And now, when the black cloud is again on the
horizon, when the trembling of the earth and the stillness of the air
are prophetic to our fears, and we turn to it instinctively for protection, -let us ask ourselves, with all its imagined faults, what is
there that can replace it ? Strip it of its power, and what shall we
get in exchange ? Discord and confusion, statutes without obedience, courts without authority, an anarchy of principles, and a chaos
of decisions, till all law at last shall be extinguished by an appeal
to arms;
Ferrique potestas
Confundet jus omne manu.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Circuit Court of the United States, Massachusetts Distriet,
May, 1855.
JOHN BROWN VS. DUCHESNE.

. Where a French vessel was rigged in France, with gaffs which hadbeen patented
in the United States, held, that as the gaffs were placed on the vessel when she
was built, as part of her original equipment, in a foreign country by persons not
within the jurisdiction of our patent laws, they were not within their application,
but exempted.
2. The patent laws were not intended to apply to, and govern a vessel of a foreign
friendly nation, resorting to our ports by our consent, for purposes of lawful
commerce.

This was an action on the case for the violation of letters patent,
granted by the United States to the plaintiff for an improvement
in the gaffs of vessels. The defendent pleaded in substance, that
he was the master of a French vessel called the Alcyon, built and
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owned in a French port, and officered and manned by French subjects. That the improvement in question was placed on-the vessel
when built, and as part of its original equipment. That the vessel
had come into the port of Boston, in the course of a lawful trading
voyage, having the said inprovement attached, as part of her rig
and equipment; and that this was the only use made thereof by
the defendant. There were other allegations in the plea, but the
opinion of the court did not rest on them. To this plea, there was
a demurrer, which was joined. The questions under the demurrer
*were elaborately -argued by
B. H. Dana, Jr., in support of the demurrer, and
Iver8 J. Austin, contra.
CURTIS, J.-The letters patent conferred on the plaintiff, the ex-

clusive right to use the thing patented, within the United States.
The terms of the grant are broad enough to include every use, by
all -persons within the territory of the United States. But this
grant, and the extensive rights conferred by it, a.re creatures of the
municipal law of our country, and however comprehensive may be
its terms, they cannot be so construed as to include, either persons
or things, not within the jurisdiction of the patent laws. Persons,
or things may be out of the jurisdiction of a municipal law, either because they are locally, where it is not in the power of our country
to extend its operations, or because the nation has chosen not to
exert its entire legislative power, but to leave particular persons or
things, though within its dominion, free from the operations of its
laws. This exemption, depending solely on the will of the nation,
may either be entire or partial and limited, according to its own
choice, which may be manifested, through the legislative power, by
express exemptions or restrictions in the text of written laws; or
it may be derived from the usages and practice of civilized nations
and the presumed intent of each, to conform thereto, until an opposite purpose is manifested; and in the absence of positive legislation, courts of justice in this country and in England have constantly and rightfully exercised the power of determining in what
cases and to what extent it is the will of the nation not to extend
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to foreigners or their property, the municipal laws, which in similar cases, govern our own citizens.
A few instances of this, may usefully be adverted to. In the
case of the Schooner -Exchange,7 Oranch, 116, it was decided, that
a public armed vessel, of a sovereign at peace with the United
States, is not within the jurisdiction of any of our tribunals, while
lying in a port of the United States. The 29th Section of the
collection act of 1799, (1 Stat. at Large, 648,) authorized the seizure
of any vessel, which having arrived within the limits of any district
of the United States, from any foreign port or place, should depart
or attempt to depart, before making report or entry. A vessel
arrived in the river St. Mary's, whose waters belonged in common to
the United States and the king of Spain. She was not bound to the
United States, but was undoubtedly within the limits of one of its collection districts, and fully within the words of the act. There could
be no doubt of the power of the United States to compel an entry,
if it had seen fit to exert it. But it was held that such an assumption of jurisdiction was not intended, and that the seizure was not
lawful. The Appollon, 9 Whea. 362.
_Tn re Bruce, 2 Or. & J. 437, property of a testator who was an
American citizen domiciled in the United States, though administered on by an English executor, and bequeathed to English legatees
was held not to be within the act imposing a duty on the payment
of legacies, upon a presumed intent of Parliament not to preclude
the property of a foreigner who was not bound to contribute to the
support of the British government. See also the case of The Universities vs. Bichardson, 6 Yes. 689, Thompson vs. The Advocate
General, 12 C1. & Fin. 1.
Upon the same footing of a presumed consent of the nation, rests
the well settled exemption of ambassadors and public ministers,
from the jurisdiction of the laws of the country to which they are
accredited.
And indeed, those numerous cases of contract, and distribution
of personalty, the status of persons, and many other relations,
which are allowed to be governed by the laws of the domicile or of
the place of the contract, though foreign to the nation which per-
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mits their operation, are all instances of partial exemption of the
persons or property. of foreigners from the jurisdiction of our
municipal laws, not provided for by any expressed will of the legislative power, but implied by courts of justice, from their general
fitness and convenience, and from the presumed acquaintance of
our country in principles and usages which civilized countries
generally have practiced.
Conceding, therefore, that this French vessel was within our
territory, and subject to all our laws, so far as it was the will of the
United States to extend those laws over it, and that the terms of
the grant to the plaintiff are broad enough to cover every use of the
thing patented, within the jurisdiction of the laws of the United
States, the inquiry still remains, whether a law of this character
was intended by Congress to apply to and govern a vessel of a
foreign friendly nation, entering our ports, by our consent, for the
purposes of trade. I say by our consent, not only because our
convention with France gives to French vessels the right to enter
our ports and trade here, but also because, if there were no such
convention, our consent would be implied until something was
done to manifest our intention not to permit it; and I prefer to
place this case, not upon the effect or operation of any treaty, which
indeed does not seem to have any particular bearing on the case,
but upon broader principles, which include vessels of all friendly
nations, resorting hither for lawful commerce.
While on the high seas, a vessel is deemed to be part of the territory of the nation to whose citizens it belongs, and under whose
flag it sails. Even there, however, it is subject to be arrested and
searched in time of war, -by public armed ships of a belligerent
power, duly commissioned. And when it enters waters belonging
exclusively to another nation, it undoubtedly becomes subject to the
municipal laws of that nation, to the extent, and in the particulars
which that nation may determine. It is also true, that for the
encouragement of commerce, and to avoid those occasions for
complaint which tend to disturb the peace of commercial States,
civilized nations, generally, have, forborne to extend some of their
municipal laws over private vessels of friendly nations entering
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their ports for trade. Unless exceptions are made by stipulations
in treaties, those municipal laws which protect the public health
and peace, and the security of the persons an& property of citizens,
the morals, the policy and the revenue of the nation, as well as
remedies upon contracts, and in some cases for torts, are ordinarily
extended over foreign vessels and the persons on board of them.
Beyond these, it is understood, that by the general consent of
civilized States, the vessels of one nation, though within the ports
of another, carry with them the laws of their country, which still
govern the rights, duties and obligations of those on board; and
that to the extent of this latter jurisdiction, and for the purpose of
enabling it to exist, the vessel is deemed to be a part of the territory of the nation to which it belongs.
Both the executive and legislative departments of our government have recognized this principle. The former, in its diplomatic
intercourse with other States, and the latter, by positive enactment.
See Mr. Webster's Letter to Lord Ashburton, 6 Webster's Works,
801; 4 Stat. at Large, 115, § 5. See also Vattel, Lib. 1, ch. 19,

§ 216.
The right of every nation, by its laws, to regulate the structure
and equipment of its vessels of commerce, must be allowed to be
complete and entire. At the same time, every other nation has a
right to exclude from its ports all vessels having, or not having a
particular structure or equipment, and to admit them only on conditions which its own welfare prescribes. This power of exclusion,
either absolute or conditional, is as clear of doubt as the former
right; but, considering the nature of the subject, and the manner
in which it has been treated in the intercourse of nations, it is
apparent, that any exercise of this power, by one nation, over the
structure or equipment ef the vessels of another, is a thing of
grave importance.
In the first place, it is the interest of each nation that the powers
belonging to every sovereign state, as such, should not be diminished
or restrained, for they are instruments for the benefit of the people
who constitute the state; and nothing should be done by one nation,
tending to embarrass their free exercise by another, unless it is clearly
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required by a just regard to its own welfare. Looking to this particular subject of the admission of the. vessels of one nation into the
ports of those of another, for the purposes of trade, we find that it
has been the subject of treaties and conventions, and that the conditions upon which admission is allowed, and sometimes the particulars in-which municipal laws shall operate, have been regulated by
precise stipulations. It cannot be doubted, that in the apprehension, especially of all commercial States, the particulars in which
the vessels of one country shall be controlled or affected by the
municipal laws of another country, while lying in its ports, is a
distinct subject of legislation, quite aside from its internal, affairs,
and to be influenced by considerations .very different from those
which would determine the grant of a monopoly affecting the domestic trade of the country. To say that, when congress legislated respecting patents, it had in view this matter, and intended to
enable private citizens to interfere with the structure or equipment
of foreign vessels, seems to me not admissible. Such an intention
may be manifested by express enactment, extending in terms to
some or all foreign vessels: it may even be deduced from a law,
broad enough in its general terms, to embrace such vessels, and
which, from its subject matter, and the mischicfs to be remedied,
may fairly be considered to have been designed to include such an
exercise of power. But in making the laws concerning patents,
congress was legislating alio intuitu. There is no sufficient reason
to suppose that they designed to touch the subject of the structure
or equipment of foreign vessels. It is, to say the least, extremely
questionable, whether it would consist with that comity which is
due to foreign nations, if we were to enable private persons to exact
damages or compensation, for the use of something which the owner
of the foreign vessel used in its structure, in conformity with the
laws of his own country, where the vessel was built. It would seem to
be very difficult also to adjust the rate, or amount of compensation
or damages, for a use which is undoubtedly lawful, even under our
municipal law, before the vessel enters our waters, and as soon as it
leaves them. Certainly the use in our waters, by a vessel belonging
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to a foreign country, is almost an unappreciable part of the use of
a thing patented.
But I do not rest on these considerations. My opinion is, that
the patent laws of the United States are not extended over foreign
vessels visiting our ports, so as to affect the structure or equipment
which they bring hither.
Judgment must be rendered for the defendant on the demurrer.

In- the -DistrictCourt of Allegleny County.-April, 1855.
SAMUEL R. WILLIAMS) EXECUTOR OF MATILDA BLACKFORD vs. W-1. STOOPS.

1. A married woman in Pennsylvania is not authorized to enter into any suretyship, or transfer her separate personal estate for the payment of her husband's
debts, nor is the husband authorized to mortgage the wife's estate, except in the
mode prescribed by the act, which must be strotly pursued.
2. The two modes of construing the married woman's act considered.

This was an action of sci. fa. sur mortgage. The facts of the
case in addition to those embodied in the opinion of the court are
briefly as follows, viz : Mrs. Blackford, the plaintiff's testatrix, held
in her own right, the defendant's note for $2,000, payable to her
order and secured by his mortgage. Sometime before the maturity
of the note, Dr. Blackford, her husband, in the purchase of a foundry,
agreed with Nimick & Co., to give them his notes, amounting in all
to $1,750, with an approved endorser. Failing, however, to procure
a satisfactory endorser, he proposed to obtain in lieu thereof, an assignment of his wife's mortgage, as collateral security for the payinent of his notes. Accordingly Mrs. Blackford executed and acknowledged before an alderman, an assignment to Kimick & Co.,
of the Stoops mortgage; specifying therein that it was as collateral
security for the payment of her husband's notes, that until default
was made in the payment of the notes at maturity, she should "have
the right to the free control of said mortgage, receive the interest and
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change the said mortgage for other security," if she deemed it advisable. And that as soon as her husband gave "an approved endorser on the said notes, they should re-assign the said mortgage
absolutely." This .assignment, together with the note of Stoops,
endorsed by Mrs. Blackford, was delivered to Nimick & Co., who
had the assignment recorded immediately.
Shortly afterwards, Mrs. Blackford died, having made a will in
which the plaintiff was appointed her executor. -He then notified
Stoops of his intention to contest the validity of the assignment,
and warned him not to make payment to Nimick & Co., the assignees. When the mortgage matured, this suit -was brought, and
on the same day Stoops, the defendant paid to Kimick & Co. the
mortgage debt, and they as assignees, entered satisfaction in full on
the record of the mortgage.
On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff gave in evidence the record
of the mortgage and rested. The -defendant under plea of payment
&c., produced and gave in evidence the note above mentioned, and
in connection therewith, offered in evidence the assignment of the
mortgage to Nimick & Co., and the entry of satisfaction by them,
and called a witness to prove that the assignment was exeduted at
the instance and with the consent of Dr. Blackford, the husband.
The court instructed the jury pro forma that the assignment was
invalid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount of
the note and interest, reserving for the consideration of the court in
banc, the question whether the plaintiff under all the legal evidence in
the cause was entitled to recover, &c. A verdict for plaintiff,
$2,255 was rendered.
The cause was argued by
Penney &' Sterrett, for the plaintiff, and
Geo. P. 1amilton and Thos. McConnell, for defendant.
The following opinion of the court in bane, on the reserved question, was delivered August 4th, 1855, by
WiLLIAms, J.-One of two constructions, it seems to me, should be
given to "the act to secure the rights of married women." It either
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confers on afeme covert all the rights, and clothes her with all the
powers of a feme sole, in respect to her separate estate, and gives to
her the same general and unqualified power to make contracts of
every description, and subjects her to all the liabilities of a feme sole
in relation to such contracts ; and in this respect "4abrogates the
marital relation with all its rights and duties :" or it merely
enables her to " own, use, and enjoy her estate as her own separate
property," with power to make contracts indispensably necessary for
its management and preservation, but without power to sell her real
estate, unless with her husband's consent, to acquire property "by
deed of conveyance or otherwise," and to charge the property so
acquired, but not her other estate with the payment of the purchase
money, and subjects her estate to liability for her torts, for debts
contracted before marriage, for liabilites necessarily incurred in the
management of her estate, and for necessaries for the support of the
family; and forbids the sale, conveyance, mortgage, transfer or incumbrance of her estate by her husband, unless her written consent
duly acknowledged before one of the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, is first had and obtained, leaving her in all other respects under the protection and disability of the common law. The,
first, which is the more literal construction of the act, seems to have
been the one adopted by the court in Cumming's Appeal, 1 Jones,
272. The objection to this construction is, that it sticks too much
in the bark and would defeat the purpose and intention of the act.
The other construction, if it be not as literal, is more in accordance
with its spirit and design, which was to secure the rights of married
women, and is the one.adopted by the court in Patterson vs. Bobbinson, and Mahon and wife vs. Uormly and wife, not yetreported.
If the literal be the true construction of the act, te testatrix had
power to pledge the whole or any portion of her separate personal
estate as security for the payment of the debts of her husband; and
the assignment of the mortgage for this purpose was valid and binding.
But the latter, as more in accordance with the spirit, must now be regarded as the settled construction of the act. And it does not author
ize a married woman to enter into any contract of suretyship for her
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husband, or to pledge, transfer, or assign her separate personal estate as security for the payment of her husband's debts, nor does it
authorize the mortgage, transfer or assignment of the wife's estate
by the husband, except in the mode -prescribed by the act.
-

The

mortgage in this case was not transferred or assigned in accordance
with the provisions of the statute which requires the wife's written
consent, duly acknowledged before one of the judges of the Common
Pleas, to be first obtained, and in no other manner had the testatrix
power to pledge or assign it, or to consent to its transfer by the
husband, as security for the payment of his debts. The assignment
was not such a contract or engagement as the act enables a married
woman to make, and for this reason it is invalid. If a married woman is not authorized by the statute to endorse a note, or to become
surety on a bond or other obligation, for her husband's debt, by
what provision of the act, other than that which requires her written consent, duly acknowledged, to be first had, is she enabled to
pledge, transfer or assign any portion of her personal estate, or to
consent to its transfer, or incumbrance by her husband as security
for the payment of his debts ? What is the real and only difference
in the nature and essence of these contracts ? By the first she incurs a personal responsibility, under which and in discharge of
which a portion or the whole of her estate may be taken. By the
second, no personal liability is incurred, but the specific property
pledged or assigned may be applied in discharge and satisfaction of the engagement. But if she may pledge a portion, she may
pledge the whole of her personal estate, and in this respect she
has the unqualified power of a feme 80le.

She may make con-

tracts other than those that are necessary for the management
and preservation of her estate. She may enter into engagements, in disregard of the salutary provisions of the act which require
her written consent, duly acknowledged, to be first had, by which
her whole personal estate may be sacrificed for her husband's debts,
and it will be of little avail that her power to endorse, or to become
surety, is denied, if she is at liberty to pledge or assign her separate personal estate as security for the payment of her husband's
debts.

162
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It does not help the defendant's case, in my opinion, that the testatrix is shown to have signed the mortgage with her husband's consent. Where one becomes the endorser or surety of another, or
where chose8 in possession or in action are transferred or pledged as
security for another's debt, the law presumes that it is done with
the debtor's consent and at his request. And in every assignment
or pledge of the wife's property for her husband's debt, the irresistible presumption would be, unless rebutted by direct and positive
proof, that it was done with the husband's consent, if not at his request, and so the jury would find. The act was intended for the
protection of married women, to prevent their estates from being
squandered by their husbands or taken in execution for their
debts.
To hold the wife's assignment or pledge of her personal property
binding and operative when made with the husband's consent, and
of no force or validity when made against his consent, would be an
idle and useless distinction. The husband's consent -will always be
presumed, and in point of fact will always be given. But the husband's consent to the transfer of his wife's property as security for
the payment of his debts, affords no protection to the wife; and to
guard -against his importunities, the act requires that the wife's
written consent, duly acknowledged, shall be first obtained.
It is plain to my mind that the act should be construed so as
to give a ferns covert the unqualified power of a feme sole to make
contracts of every description, or so as to limit and restrict her
power in this respect, to contracts indispensably necessary to the
management and preservation of her separate estate; and to engagements for the sale, mortgage, transfer, or incumbrance of her property, when her written consent, duly acknowledged, as required by
the act, is first had and obtained. Either construction furnishes a
rule that is simple and of easy application in practice, but the latter
best accords with the spirit and design of the act. But whatever
be the construction adopted, it should be inflexibly and resolutely
maintained. There should be no cases forming an exception to the
rule. If there are, it will beget the same confusion and uncertainty,
and be followed by the same practical 6vils that have grown out of
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the somewhat unsteady and conflicting decisions on the statute of
frauds and the statute of limitations. I am, therefore, unwilling to
take the initiative in making this case an exception to the power of
a married woman to make contracts, as her power is defined in the
construction given to the act in the cases not yet reported, and to
which reference has been made.
The defendant in this case was notified by the executor not to
pay the mortgage, and he paid it in his own wrong. He might
have filed a bill of interpleader against the parties, or after suit
brought, he might have paid the money into court, and obtained an
order on them to interplead. If he paid the assignees without requiring an indemnity, it was his own folly. Without notice of any
kind , a prudent man, looking merely to the terms and conditions of
the assignment, would hardly have paid the assignees and taken their
acknowledgment of satisfaction, without making some inquiry of
the mortgagee or her representative.
Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff on the verdict for the
amount found by the jury, on payment of the verdict fee.

court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County, Pa., Oct. 1855.
APPLICATION OF CITIZENS OF 3IANHEIMI TOWNSHIP, FOR A MIANDAsIUS TO
TIlE SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF SAID TOWNSHIP.

1. A mandamus cannot issue to compel the sehool directors to erect a school house
they having been vested by the Act of Assembly with discretionary power.
2. The general principle stated in Gon. vs. The Judges, 3 Binu. 273, stated and reaffirmed.

Thomas I. JBurrowes, and A. H. Hfood, for the petitioners.
A. Berr Smith, for the school directors.
HAYES, J.-The petitioners, twelve of the inhabitants of Manheltm township, pray this court to grant them a rule on Samuel
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Royer, Isaac L. Landis, John H-oover, David Harnish, Christian
B. Landis, and David Landis, directors of the common schools of
Manheim township district, in the said county of Lancaster, to
show cause if any, why a writ of mandamus should not issue, commanding them forthwith to erect and establish a common school at
some point central and convenient to the children of the petitioners,
so that they may receive that instruction and benefit which the
common school laws of the State manifestly intend for all the youth
thereof.
The said school directors have filed their answer to this petition,
in which they allege that they have kept in view, and will continue
to regard the best interests of children and parents within their district; that there are eleven school houses in Manheim township, and
one across the line in Warwick township, to which children from
Manheim township, by an arrangement with the directors, are sent;
and after stating other facts, in order to show the inexpediency of
erecting another school house at this time, and in the place desired
by the petitioners, they proceed to say, that with an anxious desire
to promote the interests of education in the district, they carefully
examined the petition of the applicants for a mandamus, inquiring
into the wants and wishes of all the parties interested, and at a full
meeting of the board, after a full and thorough investigation of the
facts, on the 12th of May, 1855, resolved that it was unnecessary
and injudicious at present to build the school house asked for by
the petitioners, and on the 23d of July, 1855, after further reflection and investigation, the said board, at a full meeting, resolved
that the interest of the township and school district did not require
the erection of said school house.
A considerable amount of testimony has been exhibited in support of the petition, and of the allegations of the answer; but as
the question on which this application must be decided, depend
upon the fact of the directors proceeding in the discharge of their
duty, it does not appear necessary for the court to enter upon the
consideration of the point, whether there is sufficient number of
school houses in the district, or whether a new school house ought
to be erected in the place which the petitioners have preferred.
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By the 23d section of the act entitled "An Act for the regulation and continuance of a system of education by common schools,"
passed the 8th day of May, 1854, the board of directors of every
district shall possess and exercise the following powers, and perform
the following duties, together with other powers and duties given
and enjoined by this act:
1. They shall establish a sufficient number of common schools for
the education of every individual above the age of five, and under
twenty-one years, in their respective districts, who may apply for
admission and instruction, either in person, or by parent, guardian, or next friend.
2. They shall cause suitable lots of ground to be procured and
suitable buildings to be erected, purchased or rented, for school
houses, and shall supply the same with the proper conveniences and
fuel, and shall have power, with the directors of adjoining districts,
to establish joint schools, and the expenses shall be paid as may be
agreed upon by the directors or controllers of said districts.
And if it shall be found that on account of great distance from,
or difficulty of access to the proper school house in any district,
sorie of the pupils thereof could be more conveniently accommodated
in the schools of an adjoining district, it shall be the duty of the
directors of such adjoining district to make an arrangement by
which such pupils may be instructed in the most convenient school
of the adjoining district, and the expense of such instruction shall
be paid as may be agreed upon by the directors or controllers of
such adjoining districts, &c., &c.
The boards of directors elected and organized under this Act of
Assembly, are unquestionably deliberative bodies.
They are to determine what is a sufficient number of common
schools for their respective districts; they are to determine what
are suitable lots of ground, and what are suitable buildings to -be
erected upon them for school houses; or whether it is better to
purchase or rent buildings for the purpose-all their duties are
subjects of deliberation-all their resolutions and acts are to be the
result of deliberation. Their numbers imply that they are to act
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upon deliberation. Their organization into a board, with president
and secretary, is for deliberation.
In regard to the matter of the petition before the court,
did the respondents, as directors of Manheim township, proceed to deliberate and. act upon the proposition ? It appears that
they did so; that the question was brought before the board on two
different occasions, was fully considered by the directors, and decided by them, and that they determined that it was inexpedient to
erect a school house applied for by the petitioners; in other words,
that it was unnecessary and injudicious.
What is the remedy in case of neglect or refusal to perform their
duties ? Is there any specific remedy provided ?
By the eighth section, if a school director refuse to attend a regular
meeting of the board after written notice to appear and enter upon the
duties of his office, or shall neglect to attend any two regular meetings of the board in succession, without excuse, or refuse to act in
his official capacity when in attendance, the directors may declare his
seat vacant; and by the ninth section, if all the members of any
board of directors, shall refuse or neglect to perform their duties,
by levying the tax required by law, and to put and keep the schbols
in operation, so far as the means of the district will admit, or shall
neglect or refuse to perform any other duty enjoined by law, the
Court of Quarter Sessions of the proper county may, upon complaint in writing by any six taxable citizens of the district, and on
due proof thereof, declare their seats vacant, and appoint others in
their stead until the next annual election for directors.
The question for the court is, are the petitioners entitled to the
writ of mandamus against these respondents, on account of their
determination in regard to the erection of the school house for
which the petitioners applied ?
Although a mandamus is of common right, yet it will be granted
only in extraordinary cases, where there would otherwise be a failure of justice. The applicant must establish a legal right as well
as the want of a specific legal remedy, 1 Harris, 75, 2 Binn. 36, 2 PaRep. 518. It is to be invoked only in cases of the last necessity,
not where there is another effectual remedy, 1 Jones, 196. Where
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an act of the Legislature provides that the County Commissioners
shall draw an order for the amount of the schoolmaster's bill for
educating poor children, if they approve thereof, the court cannot
compel them by mandamus to draw an order, if they disapprove.Nor will a mandamus lie to compel the County Commissioners to
give the assessment books to one of two parties claiming to have
been duly elected assessor, they having previously, in the exercise
of their discretion, given the books to the opposing candidate.
Gaul vs. The Com. of Phila. 2 Pars. 220.
The principles (said C. J. Tilghman) which govern the court in
issuing writs of mandamus, are well understood. Where a ministerial act is to be done, and there is no other specific remedy, a mandamus will be granted to do the act which is required. But where
the complaint is against a person who acts in a judicial or deliberative capacity, he may be ordered by mandamus to proceed to do
his duty, by deciding and acting according to the best of his judgment; but the court will not direct him in what manner to decide.
This was the principle adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of the United States vs. Lawrence, 3 Dall, 42;
and it has frequently been recognized by the court, particularly in the
case of the Commonwealth vs. The -Judgesof the Court of C:mmon
Pleas of Philadelphia County, 3 Binn. 273.
Now, in the first place, if the directors had neglected or refused
to perform their duty in regard to the furnishing a sufficient number
of school houses in their district, the remedy is specifically provided;
and therefore a mandamus is not demandable. The Act of Assembly prescribing the duty, has itself designated the remedy. But,
even if this were omitted, is the case one, in which a mandamus lies ?
Suppose the directors had utterly refused, upon demand of the
petitioners, to take the matter into consideration, whether another
school house were necessary or proper, perhaps a mandamus might
have been demandable requiring them to proceed and determine
that point ; but as they did take it into consideration, and have, on
deliberation, decided, whether wisely or not well-as the court, on
mandamus, could not have directed them how to decide, so, afortiori
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the court cannot issue a mandamus to compel them to reform their
decision.
The rule to show cause

is discharged, at the cost of th-e

petitioners.

Chittenden (Ioztnty (Vt.) Supreme Court, Dec. 1854.
Vif-IS & PLATT VS. OSCAR A. RURTON, et als.

I. In Vermont a decree of the Court of Chancery for contempt in disobeying an injunction. is not removable into the Supreme Court by appeal, it not being a
• final decree in the cause."
SPro'ceedings for contempt in one court, where the court has jurisdiction, are not
revis-able in any other court.

This case being argued, was held under advisement until the
September Circuit term, when the opinion of the court was delivered
by
REDFIELD Ch. J.-The only question made in the present case
,pon this motion to dismiss the appeal, is whether a final decree of

the court of chancery, in proceedings taken against parties to the
suit, and others confederated with them, for contempt, in disobeying an injunction of that court, is removable into this court by appeal.
I. It is certainly competent for the legislature to allow an appeal in cases like the present, and in the State of INew York, they
have done so in terms. Decisions in that State, therefore, showing
that decrees of the Court of Chancery are subject to appeal and
revision in their court of appeals, can signify nothing here, inasmuch as the right of appeal there extends to all decrees of the
Court of Chancery, interlocutory as well as final, and decrees in
cases of contempt are expressly named in the statute. So, too, in
the English practice, 3 Daniels Ch. Pr. 1633, 16-34, it is allowable
fbr the party to appeal from interlocutory as well as final decrees,
but in this State, the rule in regard to appeal from the decree of
the Court of Chancery, is different. The statute in terms, limits it
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to the final decree "in the cause," which can only be made "at the
regular term of the court," and must be taken at the same term
at which the decree is made. We can therefore obtain very little
assistance, in determining this question, from the decisions in England or New York, on account of the very marked difference in the
statutes and practice governing the Courts of Chancery, in those
countries, and our own.
II.Judging from the statute of this State, allowing appeals from
the Court of Chancery to this court, it seems to us very certain,
that an appeal will not lie from the decree of the chancellor in
matter of contempt. Proceedings in contempt are twofold; first,
before the suit is ended, to bring it to final hearing and determination. Of this character are proceedings in the English Chancery,
to compel appearance, answer, and other proceedings in the case,
preliminary to the final hearing. In our practice, these things are
got along with by taking the bill confessed, for want of proceeding on the part of defendant, and on the other hand, abandoned
for want of prosecution, according to the standing rules of court.
But the proceeding for contempt, in disobeying a temporary injunction, is much the same in the English courts as here, by
attachment and sequestration. But the decree in the matter of
contempt does not become final in the case, but is ordinarily only
for the purpose of maintaining the subject-matter of the controversy in its present state, to enable the court to award specific justice upon the final hearing. And it is obvious, these decrees, to be
of any avail, must be able to be taken promptly, upon the violation
of the injunction of the court, in vacation aswell as term time, and
that a final decree in the matter of contempt, and an order of execution, will occur in vacation,-perhaps more commonly in vacation
than in term time. To be available, speedy action is indispensable
often in such cases; and it is one of those incidental collateral matters,
which, ordinarily, certainly are not regarded as revisable in any
other court, but matter of pure discretion in the Court of Chancery.
It is certain such a decree is not what is ordinarily understood by
a "final decree in the cause," which, according to our practice, is
required to be made in term time.
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There is a large and important class of proccedings for contempt, in the Courts of Chancery, which are not regarded as a
pending litigation, but are mcrely for the purpose of carrying into
effect a final order or decree of the court. And I am not aware
that it was ever supposed, in such proceedings, that an execution
of a decree of punishment for contempt, in hindering or obstructing
the process of the court, was liable to be arrested by an appeal.
Such a proceeding would certainly prescnt an anomaly. Still, a
decree of that kind is sufficiently final. But I apprehend there is
no necessity it should be made in term time, and that it is not a
decree of that character which the legislature intended to make
appealable; for if brought into this court by appeal, we could only
determine the regularity of the proceedings, and then remand the
decree to be carried into effect in the Court of Chancery, in the
prescribed mode, as this court have now no chancery powers. We
entertain no doubt, that any decree of the Court of Chancery, in
proceedings for contempt, whether before or after the final dccreewhether to enforce a temporary or perpetual injunction, is not
appealable to this court.
In addition to the suggestions already made, we may indicate the
following, as tending to confirm the views taken.
1. The English courts have always held, that proceedings for
contempt in one court, where the court has jurisdiction of the sub-

ject-matter and of the parties, are not revisable in any other court.
This is especially true of the Superior Courts in Westminster Hall
and the two louses of Parliament. Lord .Iallor qf london'scase.
3 Wilson, 188; opinion of Ch. J. De Grey, 198. The elaborate
opinion of Kent, Ch. J., in I-ates' case, 4 Johns. R. 353, and those
of the other judges in the same c-ase, and in Yatcs vs. The Peol1e.
6 Johns. R. 338-522. This last case, first and last, in different
forms, (see Yates vs. Lauring, 5 John--. R. 282, and 6 Johns. 11.
395,) occupied the attention of the Supreme Court of New York
and their Court of Errors for a considerable number of years.
where the ablest judges and the most learned counsel literally
exhaust the whole subject of reviewing proceedings for contempt.
And no cases aire brought to light, where such proceedings, in the
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Superior Court, have ordinarily been held revisable, unless where
the proceedings were so irregular as to be against law, and to give
the court no proper jurisdiction. It is upon this ground, that the
decision in .Ez parte Langdon, 25 Vt. R. 680, goes.
2. Although an appeal lies in England from an interlocutory
decree of the chancellor to the House of Lords, no instance can be
found where such appeal, in a matter of contempt, has been maintained. Certainly I can find none; and if one could be found, it
will be no authority for such a proceeding here; but the want of such
cases in England, is significant against allowing them here.
3. The very great absurdity of carrying every decree, in matters
of contempt, before another tribunal, where the facts in the case
might be wholly unknown, and the attendant circumstances often
incapable of proof, is a sufficient reason why we should hesitate to
establish such a general doctrine or practice, unless upon the most
satisfactory authority of the statute.
4. Proceedings in contempt often have no connection with any
particular case, as for abuse of the court or its officers, in the presence of the court. In these cases, an appeal is not, we presume,
claimed to be allowable by any one. The court itself, where the
transaction occurred, could alone properly judge of its character
and aggravation. And if it be said that a power to punish at discretion is a dangerous power to trust to a single magistrate, however high, we can only say, it is one which the law of England has
always seen fit to repose there, and our legislature has not denied
it,-and one which, in these times, ordinarily, is very little liable to
abuse. The language of Ch. J. De Grey, is applicable., "Some
persons, some courts, must be trusted with discretionary powers;
Chancery has no criminal jurisdiction ; but if that court commit for
contempt, the persons committed will not be discharged by any
other court."
The appeal is dismissed.

BLAKE vs. HYDE AND OTHERS.

lVyiulham County Sureme (ourt,-eb., 1855.
WILLIAM B3LAKE AND WIFE vs RUSSELL HYDE AND OTHERS.
1. A deed to A B, and his heirs, except C B, one of the sons of A B, conveys only a

life estate to A B.
2. The remainder in fee vests immediately in those persons who will become his
heirs, if they survive him, excepting C B, who takes by purchase and not by in-

heritance.
3. Qure, whether there is any just ground for the distinction between deeds and
other instruments, in regard to the necessity of the use of the words heir, or heirs,
to create an estate in fee simple or fee tail.

This case was argued, and held under advisement until the Circuit term in September, when
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ch. J.-The question here arises upon the construction
of the deed of Benjamin Burt to Leonard Burt, November 25th,
The conflicting interest is between the grantce and the
1830.
heirs of Reuben Burt, son of Leonard Burt, he having deceased
before Leonard Burt. Reuben Burt conveyed to Hyde, the
defendant.
If at the time of the conveyance to Hyde, April 24th, 1845,
REDFIELD,

Leonard Burt was seized of the estate in fee tail, nothing will pass,
and upon the.decease of Leonard, by the rules of the common law,
the estate will go to the heir in tail. But if Leonard took only a
life estate, and a remainder in fee simple passed to certain persons
Reuben Burt being one of them, then his conveyance will vest the
remainder in his grantee, but will not go to his heirs. There can
be no doubt, we think, such was the intention of the original grantor,
Benjamin Burt. And as we have a stat itory system of conveyance
or transmission of the title of real estate, wherein we have more or less
explicitly departed from many of the common law provisions upon
the subject, it deserves serious consideration in my judgment, whether
we should make any distinction between a covenant to convey, a
will, or devise, and a deed, in regard to the indispensable necessity
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of the use of the word heirs, to create a fee simple or fee tail, or
whether that word is always to be regarded as one of limitation, and
never of purchase, in a deed, without reference to the, clearly expressed intention of the parties. The question as it affects deeds,
will probably, ultimately settle down upon the same basis it has at
common law, in regard to covenants and devises, as one of intention merely. Justice Wilmot says, in Long vs. Laning, 2 Bur.
1100, "Now it is certain that in some .cases, and under some circumstances, they (the words heir and heirs) may be construed words
of purchase, either upon a will or upon adeed." And to this effect
he cites two cases, Lisle vs. G-ray, found in Sir Th. Jones, 114; 2
Levinz, 223; Pollx., 582; Th. Raymond, 278; and Waker vs.
Snowe, in Palmer's R., 359, and concludes "They are not to be construed as words of limitation, either upon a will or upon a deed, when
the manifest intention of the testator or of the parties, is declared
to be, or clearly appears to be, that they shall not be so construed."
This is sufficiently explicit; but however sensible and sound, as a
rule of exposition, it has not generally obtained in England, in regard to deeds, but always as to covenants to convey, and wills, and.
no doubt will ultimately, everywhere, in regard to deeds, as every
one feels the absurdity of any such distinction, between deeds and
other instruments.
But it does not seem to us necessary to put this case upon the
broad ground of intention merely. The English cases treat this
case as an exception. The case of King vs. Melling, 1 Ventris,
231, wherd the devise was to one for life, et non aliter, and this
was held sufficient to give only a life estate, in the first grantee.
So too Archer's case, without negative words, but only because the
remainder is given over to the heir male in the singular number, regards the heir as taking by purchase and not byinheritance. And
Bagsktaw vs. Spencer, before Lord Harcourt, 2 Atkins, 577;
and 1 Vesey, 142, is decided as conveying to the first grantee
only a life estate, because the words "without impeachment of
waste" are used, which have no application to an estate of inheritance. But if such words may determine the extent of the estate,
so m.y others equally indicative of intention. Other cases may be
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referred to in Judge Reeves' dissertation upon this subject. Dom.
Rel. Appendix, 458.
But the remainder here being given to Leonard Burt's heirs, except Charles Burt, it is regarded by the decided cases, suffi6ient to
indicate that the term is used to designate certain persons, and is
therefore not a word of limitation upon the estate of the first grantee,
but of designation of those who are to take in remainder as purchasers. Olick vs. -Day, Cro. Eliz. 313 ; Minshall vs. Minshall, 1
Atk. 412. We are, therefore, satisfied that upon the stated rules
of construction of the common law, Leonard Burt took only a life
estate, and that the remainder in fee vested immediately in the persons who would become his heirs, if they survived him, excluding
Charles Burt, and that consequently Reuben Burt was seized of the
remainder in fee, at the time he conveyed to Russell Hyde, and that
he, by the conveyance, took the whole estate in remainder, which
belonged to his grantor, and thus excluded any interest or estate in
the heirs of such grantor. Hyde is consequently entitled to his
share, as the court below held.
Judgment affirmed.

District Court of the United States, Ohio.-October, 1854.
LEWIS F. WEIMER VS. RUSHt R. SLOANE.

1

1. To sustain the allegations of the declaration in this suit, which is for aiding or
abetting in the escape of slaves, under the fugitive slave act of 1850, it must appear that the alleged fugitives were slaves who had escaped from service, and
had been arrested by the owner or his agent; and that the defendant, with knowledge of these facts, aided and abetted their escape.
2. The statute authorizes an arrest, either by the owner or his agent, with or without warrant; but when made by an agent, lie must be authorized by a written
power of attorney, executed and authenticated :as required by the statute.
8. To make the defendant liable, it must appear that lie had notice or knowledge
that the .-laves were fugitives, and were at the time of the alleged unlawful interference, in cuetody under an arrest; but this notice or knowledge may be inferred
from circumstances.
Tihii ca'

wil be found in 6 M-Lean, not yet i'sued from the press.
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4. The test of the legality of an arrest is the law, and not the opinion of the defendant.
5. Any words or actions tending to effect an escape, and which lead to that result,
are sufficient to implicate the defendant in the charge of aiding or abetting the
escape.
6. An intention to effect an escape must appear, but such intention may be inferred
from the facts. Every one is presumed to have intended the result necessarily and
legitimately flowing from his acts.
7. A party acting as counsel for a fugitive slave, is protected from the consequences
of his acts, so far only as they are within the proper limits of his professional duty.

Stanbery, for the plaintiff.
S.
Messrs. ,o.fn
Messrs. Vinton & Hunter, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEAVITT, J.-This action is founded on the seventh section of
the Act of Congress of the 18th of September, 1850, known as the
fugitive slave act, brought to recover the value of three persons
named in the declaration, who, it is alleged, were the slaves of the
plaintiff, owing him labor or service as such, in the State of"Kentucky, and who escaped from him into the State of Ohio. There
are several counts in the declaration, but as a verdict is insisted on
upon the third count only, charging the defendant with having aided,
assisted, or abetted in the escape of the alleged fugitives, the inquiries of the jury will be limited to that charge.
To sustain this charge, it must appear to the satisfaction of the
jury, that the persons named in the declaration, at the time of the
alleged illegal interference by the defendant, were the slaves of the
plaintiff, owing him labor or service in the State of Kentucky; that
they escaped into the State of Ohio, and had been arrested either
by the owner, or his agent or attorney; and that the defendant,
with knowledge that they were slaves, and had been arrested as
fugitives, unlawfully aided, abetted, or assisted them to escape.
As it is not controverted, that the alleged fugitives were the
slaves of the plaintiff in Kentucky, and that they escaped into Ohio,
it is not necessary to advert specially to the evidence proving these
facts. I will briefly notice the testimony touching the nature and
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extent of the defendant's interference with the rights of the plaintiff,
before I advert to the legal principles involved in the case.
The first witness introduced by the plaintiff is James P. Patton,
who says, that being at Sandusky city, in pursuit of some slaves
who had escaped from his service, he received at that place a
power of attorney from the plaintiff, authorizing him to arrest the
slaves named in the declaration; that on the 20th of October, 1852,
the slaves arrived in the cars, and were seen by the witness at the
depot of the Mansfield railroad. They were conducted by a colored
man, from the depot to the steamboat Arrow, then lying at the
wharf of the city, and were put on board. Witness called on Rice,
a police officer of the city, and one Hedges, and another person, to
assist in the arrest of the negroes. They went on board the steamboat, and the witness Patton saw and recognized them. He inquired
of them, if they did not wish to return to Kentucky. George, one
of the negroes, replied, that he' did not care about going back.
They were then arrested, it being about half-after seven in the evening of the 20th of October, and, followed by a large crowd, proceeded to the Mayor's office. The negroes were taken into the
office and took their seats on a settee on the south side of the room.
The Mayor, Mr. Follett, was in the office; the room wag crowded,
and there was a good deal of excitement. Witness stated to the
people present that the negroes were slaves, and informed the Mayor
that he wanted a trial, to prove property. The power of attorney
under which he made the arrest, with some others in his possession,
had been laid upon the table at which the Mayor was writing, by
Rice. After some time the Mayor said he doubted whether he had
any authority to try the case, and refused to do so, at the same
time referring witness to a magistrate. Witness said he was determinet to hold the negroes. The defendant stepped out of the
crowd, and said, Who is it that detains these colored people ? Witness replied that he did. Defendant then inquired if Marshal Rice
was in the room, and Rice replied that he was. Defendant asked
Rice if he had a warrant to arrest the negroes, who said he had
no warrant. Defendant then asked witness if he had a warrant,
and was informed that he had none, and that he had arrested the
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negroes without any warrant, and brought them before the proper
authority, etc. Defendant said to witness, you should have had a
warrant, and could not arrest without a warrant. Witness replied
that he could arrest without a warrant, and' intended to hold the
negroes, and would hold every one responsible, if they were taken
from him. Defendant smiled at this. Some conversation then followed about the value of the slaves, and witness said to defendant,
he would hold him individually responsible, if he interfered with
them, and that he might expect to pay $1000 for each of the
negroes, if he caused them to be taken out of his custody. Some conversation then took place, as to the ability of the defendant to pay
for the slaves. Witness said he would have to pay for them if he
interfered in their rescue, as he would certainly be sued. Defendant then took off his hat, and waved it over his head and said, Colored friends, arise, and take those colored friends of yours out of
the room with a row, or a rush. Witness is not quite certain which
of these words were used. The crowd, of whom some twenty were
colored men, some of them armed with clubs, rushed towards the
slaves, and forced them out of the room with a rush. Witness has
never seen them since, and they have never been retaken. On his
cross-examination, the witness stated that the power of attorney from
the plaintiff was delivered to him at Sandusky, about a week before
the arrest, and that before going to the mayor's office, he had
handed that with others, to Rice. At the office, the mayor requested witness to select the power identifying the negroes; he
selected it, with another, and handed them to the mayor. Witness
was armed with a revolver. Says he did not know till next morning that defendant was a lawyer.
W. W. Hedges says, he was at Sandusky city in pursuit of some
negroes who had escaped from him in Kentucky. First saw the
plaintiff's negroes on the steamboat Arrow, on the night they were
arrested. Was informed they were there, and assisted Patton,
Rice, and another person, to take them. Patton had requested him
to assist. The negroes were arrested at the cook-room of the boat.
Witness went with the crowd to the mayor's office, after the arrest.
Rice was in company, and on going into the office, he laid some
12
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papers on the mayor's desk. Some conversation took place between
Patton, Rice, and the mayor, which witness did not hear. Heard
some one ask, who brought the negroes there. Did not know defendant then. Now thinks it was defendant who made the inquiry.
Defendant then inquired for Rice, and asked him if he had a warrant to arrest the blacks. Then asked Patton if he had a warrant.
Patton said he had none, but was authorized to arrest them. Defendant then took off his hat and waved it, saying: Colored people, remove your friends with a rush or row. On his cross-examination,
the witness says he thinks defendant had a white hat. Says that
two of the negroes, a man and a woman, recognized Patton on the
boat, before the arrest. Says, also, that he heard defendant distinctly at the mayor's office, and that he spoke loud.
Oliver Rice testifies, that in October, 1852, he was acting as a
constavble and marshal of Sandusky city.' Was at the steamboat
Arrow. Patton and one Shrove had some negroes in charge.
Patton said he had arrested them as slaves, and handed his papers
to witness. Went to mayor's office; there was quite a crowd, and
a good deal of excitement. Witness laid the papers on the mayor's
desk. Did not hear much of the conversation between Patton and
the mayor. After some time, defendant, came into the room.
Some conversation between defendant, Patton, and the mayor.
Defendant had taken his seat near the mayor. Heard him ask if
Rice, the marshal, was present. Witness replied that he was. And
defendant then inquired of him if he had a warrant to arrest the
negroes. Witness replied that he had no warrant. Defendant
then raised his hat, and said: Friends of these colored people,
remove them with a rush; and they all went out. There were a
good many colored persons present, armed with clubs. Witness
heard one of them say, they should never take the negroes away
alive. On cross-examination, says, he thinks Patton was at the
railroad depot. Patton had informed witness before what his business was, and that he wished witness to assist him. Witness's object in going to the steamboat was to suppress any riot, etc. Says
defendant spoke in a loud voice at the mayor's office, and that be
wore a white hat.
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On the part of the defendant, a good deal of testimony has been
introduced to prove the occurrences at the mayr's office, and to
discredit the statements of the plaintiff's witnesses.
John B. Lott says, he was on the steamboat at the time the
negroes were arrested, and went with the crowd to the mayor's
office; called on the defendant at his office, to procure his services
for the negroes as counsel. Defendant proceeded to the mayor's
office, inquired for Rice, asked him if the negroes were in custody,
and wished to see the authority by which they were held. Said he
saw nothing to authorize their detention. Witness heard some one
then say, hussle them out, and they all left the room.
Marshal Burton says, defendant is an attorney at Sandusky city.
Witness was at the mayor's office, evening of October 20, 1852: It
was much crowded. Heard defendant inquire by what authority
the negroes were detained. Defendant was near the centre of the
room. Witness heard no answer to defendant's inquiry. Thinks
defendant asked a second time for the authority by which the
negroes were held. No reply to this. Defendant said, he saw no
reason why they should be detained. Some one said, hussle them
out. Witness saw defendant in the room. Thinks he had no hat
on. Saw no movement of his hat. Heard nothing said by defendant about moving the colored people with a rush. Thinks he would
have heard it, if it had been said. Did not hear defendant inquire
for Rice. Thinks he would have heard it, if such inquiry had been
made.
H. M. Cheeseborough: Was present at the mayor's office. Was
there ten or fifteen minutes before anything was done in the way of
business. Did not notice defendant, till he heard him inquire by
by what authority the negroes were held. Did not seem to address
this inquiry to any one in particular. Witness heard some one ask
for Rice. Some person said, the papers were with the mayor
Defendant repeated his inquiry as to authority. He paused, turned
partly r-ound, and said, there appeared to be nothing against these
persons to detain them. Some one said, hussle them out, and the
room was soon clear. When defendant spoke of there being no
authority to detain the negroes, he turned toward the place where
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they were sitting. Did not see his hat, or any motion with a hat.
Did not see Ricein the room at all. Heard nothing from defendant about colored persons removing their colored friends with a
rush. Thinks he would have heard it, etc.
Mr. Jennings says, he was at the mayor's office. Saw defendant
come in. Was accompanied by a colored man. Thinks he had a
book in his hand. Heard- defendant inquire, by what authority the
negroes were detained. Thinks he heard the mayor say, he had no
jurisdiction of the matter. Heard defendant ask for Rice. Rice
came forward, as witness thinks. Defendant inquired if the negroes
were in his custody. Rice said they were not detained by.a warrant in his hands. Defendant then said, if there is no authority for
holding them, they can go. All went out in a hurry. Thinks defendant had no hat on. Not positive as to this. Did not hear him
say colored friends, etc. Thinks he would have heard the words,
if they had been used. When defendant said, if there is no
authority to hold the negroes, they can go, he turned round to
the crowd.
Mr. Clark : Was at the mayor's office. Heard defendant inquire
twice, by what authority the negroes were detained. Heard no
reply. Defendant then said, he saw no reason why they should be
detained. A colored man by the name of Locke, then said, rush
them out, and they all left. Defendant had no hat on, and did not
appear to be excited.
Joseph Jibbeau testifies as to what happened at the mayor's office:
Detendant inquired for authority, etc. Asked for Rice, who came
forward, and defendant asked him if he had a warrant. Rice said
he had no warrant, etc. Defendant then asked, if there were any
papers or authority by which the negroes were detained. Asked
two or three time. No reply to this. After a short pause, defendant said, Colored friends, I don't see anything to detain your
friends. Locke then said, hussle them out, and they went out in
quick time. Defendant spoke in a medium tone of voice. Thinks
he had no hat on. Did not wave his hat. Did not use the words
attributed to him by plaintiff's witnesses. Thinks he heard some
one say, in reply to defendant's inquiry for authority, that the
mayor had the papers.
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Mr. Follett: Was mayor of Sandusky city, October 20, 1852.
Heard a noise in the street. The crowd came into the office. Witness was writing at the time. Knew there were slaves there. Negroes were seated in the room. Witness paid no attention, but
kept on writing, with his back to the negroes. After some time,
Rice came in and laid the papers on witness's desk. Did not look
at the papers. Mr. Bill asked, what he was going to do. Witness
replied, he had no jurisdiction. Thinks he never spoke to Patton,
or Patton to him. After some time, Rice came to his desk, and
witness handed the papers to him. Rice asked witness if he had
examined them, and witness replied that he had not. Witness went
towards the door. Defendant came in, turned round and said, By
what authority are these persons held in custody ? Are there any
papers to show why they are held here ? Thinks Patton said, Rice
Oolored citizens, I see no
has the papers. Defendant then said, O
authority for detaining your colored friends. The negroes and the
crowd then went out. Patton then came up to defendant, and said,
Here are the papers; those slaves are mine, and I will hold you responsible. Witness supposed that claimant had not before made
known his claim. There was not much noise or excitement. Recollects distinctly that defendant had no hat on, or with him.
Thinks it was after the crowd had left, and before Patton said,
Rice has the papers, that defendant made the remark, that he saw
no authority for detaining the negroes, etc. Defendant may have
used these words before. Witness says defendant did not use
the words testified to by Patton, Hedges, and Rice. That Patton
did not come to his desk, and ask him what lie was going to do,
and select the papers, etc.
Having given this condensed statement of the material facts in
evidence, I do not propose to analyze, or make any comments upon
them, -with a view of aiding you in coming to a conclusion, as to
what is or is not proved. That duty belongs exclusively to the
jury, and I leave it to their deliberate and unbiased action. I
shall merely state the legal principles involved in the case, and
leave it to the jury to make the application of them to the facts.
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As before stated, there is no dispute in this case, that the three
persons named in the declaration as the slaves of the plaintiff, were
in fact such in Kentucky, and that they escaped thence into the
state of Ohio. But it must moreover appear, that they were in legal
custody, by an arrest, either with or without warrant, by the owner
or some person legally authorized by him to recapture them. The
6th sec. of the act of congress before referred to, provides, "that
where a person held to service or labor in any state or territory in the
United States, has heretofore, or shall hereafter escape into another
state or territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom
such. ervice or labor maybe due, or his, or her, or their agent or attorney, duly authorized by power of attorney in writing, acknowledged
and certified under the seal of some legal officer or court, of the
state or territory in which the same may be executed, may pursue
and reclaim such fugitive person, either by procuring awarrant from
some one of the courts, judges or commissioners aforesaid, of the
proper circuit, district or county, for the apprehension of such fugitive; or by seizing and arresting such fugitive, where the same can
be done without process; and by taking or causing such person to
be taken before such court, judge, or commissioner," etc.
It will be seen from the foregoing provision of the statute, that
the authority is expressly given to the owner of the fiti tive, or his
agent or attorney, to arrest without warrant. The arrest in this
case was made by Patton, as the agent of the plaintiff, without any
warrant for this purpose. It appears also that the power of attorney under which he acted as agent, was executed and authenticated
according to the requirement of the act of congress. The arrest of
these fugitives was therefore clearly authorized by law, and they
were legally in the custody of the plaintiff's agent, at the time of
the alleged interference by the defendant.
But to sustain the present action, it must appear to the satisfaction of thejury, that the defendant had notice or knowledge that
these persons were fugitives, and were legally in custody, when be
aided in their escape. It is one of the material allegations in the
plaintiff's declaration, that defendant knowingly, willingly and illegally aided or abetted the escape of the fugitives. This must there-
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fore be proved as essential to the plaintiff's right of recovery.

But

the knowledge of the defendant, both as to the persons being fugitives and being in legal custody, either may be established, by positive proof, or may be inferred from circumstances. In the case of
Giltner vs. Gorham et al, 4 McLean, 420, it was held, that "to
bring an individual within the statute, he must have knowledge thatthe colored persons are fugitives from labor, or he must act under
such circumstances as show that he might have had such knowledge by exercising ordinary prudence." It is in evidence in this
case, that the defendant was employed as counsel for the fugitives,
and it is not perhaps an unreasonable presumption, that he was apprised of all the facts which rendered it necessary that his professional aid should be invoked in their behalf.
As already intimated, the jury must be satisfied that the defendant had knowledge that the fugitives had been arrested, and were
in custody at the time of his alleged interference. If the plaintiff's
agent held them without authority,!they were illegally detained, and
no one could have incurred liability by aiding them in their escape.
It will be for the jury to determine, in reference to all the circumstances, whether the defendant may not be presumed to have known
that the fugitives had been arrested. It is in evidence, both by the
plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses, that on entering the mayor's
office, he inquired by what authority the colored persons were held.
If the witnesses for the plaintiff are entitled to credit, he was informed distinctly that the negroes were claimed by Patton, as agent
of plaintiff, and that he had arrested them as he was authorized to
do, without warrant. From the occurrences which followed the announcement of the fact, that the arrest had been -made without warrant, it seems most probable the defendant supposed the negroes
could only be taken and held in custody, by an arrest under a warrant. The power of attorney proving the agency of Patton, was
laid on the mayor's desk, and could have been seen by the defend-

ant, if he had wished or requested to see it.

If, under the erroneous

belief that a warrant was necessary to justify the arrest of the fugitives, he did not ask for its production, or use reasonable diligence
to ascertain the existence of the instrument, he is not protected
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from the consequences of his acts. As before stated, no liability
was incurred by the defendant, without a legal arrest and detention
of the fugitives; but the test of the legality of the arrest is to be
determined by the statute and not by the opinion of the defendant.
On receiving information that there was no warrant, it would have
been altogether proper for the defendant to have required the production of the written power under which the plaintiff's agent acted;
and if this request had been evaded or refused, there would have
been reason for the conclusion, that the fugitives were in custody
without any authority to detain them.
If the jury are satisfied that these persons were fugitive slaves
and were legally in the custody of the plaintiff's agent, at the time
of their escape, and that these facts were known to the defendant,
or that, from the circumstances, he is fairly chargeable with such
knowledge, the further inquiry remains, whether he aided, abetted,
or assisted in their escape, in the sense of being liable to the penalty
fixed by the statute. On this subject, I have only to remark, that
any words or actions tending to produce an escape, if the result follows, will subject a party to the penalty of the law. It is not necessary that there should be any physical force used, to effect the
escape. It is true, the party implicated must have intended such a
result, but this intention may be inferred from the facts. Every
one is presumed to have intended whatever is the necessary and
legitimate result of his acts. If therefore an escape follows, as the
result of certain words or acts, the law raises the presumption, that
it was intended, and holds the party responsible.
In the case of Vaughan vs. Williams, 3 McLean, 530, which
was an action for damages for rescuing certain slaves from the possession of the plaintiff, the learned judge said, in reference to -what
constituted an interference, subjecting the defendant to the penalty
of the statute, that " if he (the defendant) countenanced and encouraggd, from time to time, the movements of the crow d'which resulted
in the rescue, or being present, sanctioned it in any form, he is
liable to the penalty. A man cannot incite others to the commission of an illegal act, and escape the consequences, by the plea that
le did not put forth his hand in the eonsummation of the act."
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As to the occurences at the mayor's office, there are some discrepancies between the witnesses for the plaintiff' and those for the defendant. It is the exclusive province of the jury to decide upon
the credit due to the testimony of witnesses. It will be their duty,
if practicable, to harmonize their conflicting statements, and thus
avoid the conclusion that any have wilfully falsified the truth. But
if this cannot be done, they must receive or reject the testimony,
as their best judgment shall dictate. If the witnesses for the
plaintiff are accredited, there is no room for a doubt, that the defendant unlawfully interfered for the rescue of the slaves. The
words attributed to him by these witnesses, could have no other
effect, under the circumstances of the case, than to induce the crowd
to interfere for the rescue of the slaves. Rice, one of the plaintiff's
witnesses, is impeached by proof of bad character for truth; and
unless his testimony is corroborated by other witnesses entitled to
credit, it will be the duty of the jury to reject it.
The points of difference in the narratives of the witnesses, as to
what took place at the mayor's office, are doubtless obvious to the
jury, and need not be specially noticed. If, however, the jury
shall reject the statements of all the plaintiff's witnesses, as unworthy of credit, it will be proper for them to inquire whether, upon
the defendant's evidence, a verdict ought to pass for the plaintiff.
What is sufficient to constitute an illegal aiding, abetting or assisting the escape of a fugitive slave, under the statute, has been stated
by the court. It will be for the jury to make the application of the
principles laid down, to the facts before them. It will be for them
to inquire and decide, whether the evidence warrants the conclusion
that the acts and words of the defendant were the direct cause of
the escape of the negroes. If without implicating the defendant, they
can find a satisfactory reason for the sudden and hurried movements in
the mayor's office, resulting in the escape of the slaves, it will be their
duty to do sb. The statute under which this suit is instituted, is
highly penal in its provisions, and the party seeking a recovery
upon an alleged violation of it, should be held to strict proof.
There is one point which has been strenuously urged by counsel,
to which it is the duty of the court to call the attention of thejury.
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It is insisted, that the defendant acting as counsel for the fugitives, did no more than he was warranted in doing from his professional relation to them. In the case of Yorris vs. Nrewton et al,
5 IcLean, 102, one of the defendants, acting as counsel for the
slaves it was contended that in that character he was protected from
liability. The court stated the law to the jury in these words : "So
far as his acts were limited to the duties of counsel, he is not responsible. But, if he exceeded the proper limits of a counsellor at law,
he is responsible for his acts, the same as any other individual."
This is doubtless the true principle, as applicable to this point.
Persons arrested and in custody upon the charge of being fugitive
slaves, have an undoubted right to all the benefits of counsel. And
it is in no sense improper, that counsel should advise and assist persons in that situation. In their professional character, they may
inquire into the authority by which the fugitives are held, or insist
on a legal investigation of the question whether they are slaves;
and on the hearing before competent authority, may urge their discharge from custody. If satisfied they are illegally restrained of
their liberty, the great remedy by writ of habeas eerpus may be
rightfully resorted to. In short, any proceeding which is in accordance with the law of the land, may be instituted to test the question
of the legality of their detention. But it would be extending the
prineiple of professional privilege too far, to say that a lawyer is
justified, even in behalf of a fugitive slave, in aiding and assisting
his escape, in any mode which the law does not sanction. There is
perhaps good reason to infer, from the evidence in this case, that
the defendant supposed the slaves could not be held in legal custody
without an arrest by warrant. As already stated, the law does not
require this process to authorize an arrest. And if the defendant,
under any misapprehension of the statute, has brought himsclf within its penalties, he is not protected from responsibility by his professional character.
But it is quite unnecessary to detain the jury with further remarks, in committing this case to them. The trial has been conducted throughout, by the counsel, not only with great ability, but
with great fairness. No efforts have been made to introduce any
false issues, or in any way to divert the winds of the jury from the
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merits of the case. This is creditable to the gentlemen concerned,
and worthy of their distinguished professional standing. It remains
for the jury, excluding every extrinsic consideration from their
view, to decide this case in accordance with the duty their oath imposes. If, in their judgment, the plaintiff has sustained an injury
for which the law applied to the facts, entitles him to redress, I have
the fullest confidence they will award it to him by their verdict.
If, on the other hand, they should come to the conclusion that the
defendant is not implicated as charged, the jury will cheerfully
acquit him of all censure, by a verdict in his favor. And I need not
say that in the decision of this case, the individual views of the jurors, as to the justice and expediency of the law upon which the
action is founded, should have no weight.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which, on a motion
for a new trial, the court refused to set aside.

CHARLES

I. GIBBONS vs. RUSH R. SLOANE.

This suit was brought to recover the value of a slave owned by
the plaintiff, who escaped and was rescued at the same time
and under the same circumstances, as in the preceding case of Weiner vs. Sloane. The evidence was the same in both cases, except
as to the manner of the execution of the power of attorney to Patton, who made the arrest as the agent of Gibbons; and by the consent of the counsel, both cases were submitted to the jury at the
same time. In this case, it appeared that Gibbons had executed a
power of attorney in the state of Kentucky, as required by the act
of congress, in which either no name was inserted as the agent of
the plaintiff, or, if any, that of some person other than Patton; and
that afterwards and before the arrest of the fugitive by Patton, his
name was inserted by the plaintiff or some other person, at Sandusky
City in the State of Ohio, without any acknowledgment of the instrument in that State. The court instructed tlhe jury, that under
the act of 1850, this was not a valid power to Patton and did not
authorize him to make the arrest. The jury returned a verdict for
the defendant.

